

Expected Scott-Suppes Utility Representation

Nuh Aygün Dalkıran
Oral Ersoy Dokumacı
Tarık Kara

February 7, 2018

Outline

- 1 Introduction
 - Motivation
- 2 Preliminaries
 - Semiorders
 - Uncertainty
 - Continuity
 - Independence
 - Utility Representations
- 3 The Representation Theorem
 - Expected Scott-Suppes Utility Representation
- 4 On Epsilon Equilibrium
- 5 Independence of the Axioms
- 6 Conclusion
- 7 Appendix

Motivation

Jules Henri Poincaré (1905) in *The Value of Science*:

Sometimes we are able to make the distinction between two sensations while we cannot distinguish them from a third sensation. For example, we can easily make the distinction between a weight of 12 grams and a weight of 10 grams, but we are not able to distinguish each of them from a weight of 11 grams. This fact can symbolically be written: $A = B$, $B = C$, $A < C$.



Motivation

Example (Luce(1956))

Suppose an individual prefers a cup of coffee with one cube of sugar to a cup of coffee with five cubes of sugar. We can make four hundred and one cups of coffee, label each cup with $i = 0, 1, \dots, 400$, and add $(1 + i/100)$ cubes of sugar to the i^{th} cup. Since the increase in the amount of sugar from one cup to next is **too small to be noticed**, the individual would be indifferent between cups i and $i + 1$. However, he is not indifferent between cups 0 and 400.

Motivation

- **Psychophysics:** The branch of psychology that deals with the relationship between **physical stimulus** and **mental phenomenon**:
 - No two physical stimuli are absolutely identical, although they may seem to be.
 - The question of interest is how large must the difference be between two stimuli in order for us to detect it.
 - The amount by which two stimuli must differ in order for us to detect the difference is referred to as the JND - **just noticeable difference**.
- **The Weber Fechner Law (1850s):** A small increase in the physical stimulus may not result in a change in perception.

Motivation

-
- Apple with 0.2712
 - Banana with 0.5399
 - Carrot with 0.1888
-

-
- Apple with 0.2713
 - Banana with 0.5398
 - Carrot with 0.1889
-

ECONOMETRICA

VOLUME 21

OCTOBER, 1953

NUMBER 4

LE COMPORTEMENT DE L'HOMME RATIONNEL DEVANT
LE RISQUE: CRITIQUE DES POSTULATS ET AXIOMES DE
L'ECOLE AMERICAINE¹

PAR M. ALLAIS²

ENGLISH SUMMARY

The most important points of this article can be summarized as follows:

- (1) Contrary to the apparent belief of many authors, the concept of cardinal utility, $\bar{s}(x)$, can be defined in an operational manner either by considering equivalent differences of levels of satisfaction or by use of the Weber-Fechner *minimum sensible* or psychological threshold.

Thus one can associate a psychological value $\bar{s}(x)$ with each monetary value x .

Motivation

Is indifference transitive? Armstrong (1939, 1948, 1950, 1951) has repeatedly questioned this question:

*That indifference is not transitive is **indisputable**, and a world in which it were transitive is indeed **unthinkable**. [Armstrong 1948, p3]*

Semiorders, Luce (1956)

Definition

Let $>$ and \sim be two binary relations on X .

The pair $(>, \sim)$ is a *weak-order* on X if for each $x, y, z, t \in X$,

W1. exactly one of $x > y$, $y > x$, or $x \sim y$ holds,

W2. \sim is an equivalence relation,

W3. $>$ is transitive.

Equivalently, “ \succeq ” := “ $>$ ” \cup “ \sim ” is complete and transitive.

- $x > y$ means “ x is (strictly) preferred to y ”.
- $x \sim y$ means “ x is indifferent to y ”.

Semiorders, Luce (1956)

Definition

Let P and I be two binary relations on X . The pair (P, I) is a **semiordering** on X if for each $x, y, z, t \in X$,

- S1. exactly one of $x P y$, $y P x$, or $x I y$ holds
- S2. $x I x$,
- S3. $x P y$, $y I z$, $z P t$ implies $x P t$,
- S4. $x P y$, $y P z$, and $y I t$ imply not both $t I x$ and $t I z$.

Semiorders, Luce (1956)

Definition

Let P and I be two binary relations on X . The pair (\mathbf{P}, \mathbf{I}) is a **semiorder** on X if for each $x, y, z, t \in X$,

- $x I x$ (**reflexivity**),
- exactly one of $x P y$, $y P x$, or $x I y$ holds (**trichotomy**),
- $x P y I z P t \implies x P t$ (**strong intervality**),
- $x P y P z I t \implies x P t$ (**semitransitivity**).

Semiorders, Luce (1956)

Definition

Let P and I be two binary relations on X . The pair (\mathbf{P}, \mathbf{I}) is a **semiorder** on X if for each $x, y, z, t \in X$,

- $x I x$ (**reflexivity**),
- exactly one of $x P y$, $y P x$, or $x I y$ holds (**trichotomy**),
- $x P y I z P t \implies x P t$ (**strong intervality**), ($\mathbf{PIP} \implies \mathbf{P}$)
- $x P y P z I t \implies x P t$ (**semitransitivity**). ($\mathbf{PPI} \implies \mathbf{P}$)

Semiorders, Luce (1956)

Definition

Let P and I be two binary relations on X . The pair (\mathbf{P}, \mathbf{I}) is a **semiorder** on X if for each $x, y, z, t \in X$,

- $x I x$ (**reflexivity**),
- exactly one of $x P y$, $y P x$, or $x I y$ holds (**trichotomy**),
- $x P y I z P t \Rightarrow x P t$ (**strong intervality**), (**PIP \Rightarrow P**)
- $x I y P z P t \Rightarrow x P t$ (**reverse semitransitive**). (**IPP \Rightarrow P**)

Semiororders - Canonical Example

Example

Let $x, y \in \mathbb{R}$ and define (P, I) on \mathbb{R} as follows:

- $x P y$ if $x > y + \mathbf{1}$,
- $x I y$ if $|x - y| \leq \mathbf{1}$.

Scott-Suppes Representation

Theorem (Scott and Suppes (1958))

Let X be a finite set. (P, I) is a semiorder on $X \iff$ there exists $u : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that for each $x, y \in X$,

$$x P y \iff u(x) > u(y) + \mathbf{1},$$

$$x I y \iff |u(x) - u(y)| \leq \mathbf{1}.$$

Scott-Suppes Representation

Let R be a reflexive binary relation on X and $x, y \in X$.

The **asymmetric part of R** , denoted P , as

$$x P y \iff x R y \wedge \neg(y R x).$$

The **symmetric part of R** , denoted I , as

$$x I y \iff x R y \wedge y R x.$$

Definition

Let R be a reflexive binary relation on X , $u : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, and $k \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$. The pair (u, k) is an **SS representation** of R if for each $x, y \in X$,

$$x P y \iff u(x) > u(y) + \mathbf{k},$$

$$x I y \iff |u(x) - u(y)| \leq \mathbf{k}.$$

Order Theoretic Definitions

Definition

Let $x, y, z \in X$. A binary relation R on X is

- *reflexive* if $x R x$,
- *irreflexive* if $\neg(x R x)$,
- *complete* if $[x R y] \vee [y R x]$,
- *symmetric* if $x R y \implies y R x$,
- *asymmetric* if $x R y \implies \neg(y R x)$,
- *transitive* if $x R y R z \implies x R z$.

Immediate Observations on Semiorders

Let (P, I) be a semiorder on X .

- P is **irreflexive**.
- I is **symmetric**.
- P is **asymmetric**.
- P is **transitive**. $x P y P z \implies x P y I y P z \implies x P z$
- $x I y$ **if and only if** $\neg(x P y)$ and $\neg(y P x)$.
- Every weak order induces a **natural** semiorder.

Auxiliary Relations

Definition

Let (P, I) be a semiorder on X and $x, y \in X$.

- xRy if $\neg(y P x)$ (i.e., $x P y$ or $x I y$),
- xR_0y if $\exists z \in X$ s.t. $[x P z R y] \vee [x R z P y]$,
- xR_0y if $\neg(y P_0 x)$,
- xI_0y if $x R_0 y \wedge y R_0 x$.

On R_0

- $x R_0 y$ **if and only if** for each $z \in X$, $[y R z \Rightarrow x R z]$ and $[z R x \Rightarrow z R y]$.

The contrapositive of $[y R z \Rightarrow x R z]$ is $[z P x \Rightarrow z P y]$.

The contrapositive of $[z R x \Rightarrow z R y]$ is $[y P z \Rightarrow x P z]$.

- $x R_0 y$ **if and only if** for each $z \in X$, $[y P z \Rightarrow x P z]$ and $[z P x \Rightarrow z P y]$.

Some Useful Results

From now on, $\mathbf{R} = \mathbf{P} \cup \mathbf{I}$:

Lemma

Let R be a semiorder on X and $x, y, z \in X$.

If $x R_0 y P z$ or $x P y R_0 z$, then $x P z$.

Proposition (Luce (1956) Theorem 1)

If R is a semiorder on X , then R_0 is a weak order on X .

$\therefore R_0$ is the **natural** weak order induced by the semiorder R .

Uncertainty

- $X = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n\}$, $n \in \mathbb{N}$.
- A **lottery** on X is a list $p = (p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n)$ such that $\sum p_i = 1$ and for each $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$, we have $p_i \geq 0$.
- **L** : the set of all lotteries on X . For each lottery $p, q \in L$ and $\alpha \in (0, 1)$, $\alpha p + (1 - \alpha)q \in L$.

vNM Expected Utility Theorem

Theorem (von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944))

A binary relation R on L is **complete**, **transitive**, **continuous**, and satisfies **independence** if and only if there exists a **linear** utility function $u : L \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that

$$pRq \iff \mathbb{E}[u(p)] \geq \mathbb{E}[u(q)]$$

Furthermore, $u : L \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is **unique** up to **affine** transformations.

Continuity

Definition

A reflexive binary relation R on L is

- **continuous** if for each $q \in L$, the sets
$$\text{UC}(q) := \{p \in L : p R q\} \text{ and } \text{LC}(q) := \{p \in L : q R p\}$$
are closed (with respect to the standard metric on \mathbb{R}^n),
- **mixture-continuous** if for each $p, q, r \in L$, the sets
$$\text{UMC}(q; p, r) := \{\alpha \in [0, 1] : [\alpha p + (1 - \alpha)r] R q\}$$
and
$$\text{LMC}(q; p, r) := \{\alpha \in [0, 1] : q R [\alpha p + (1 - \alpha)r]\}$$
are closed (with respect to the standard metric on \mathbb{R}).

Lemma

If a semiorder R on L is continuous, then it is mixture-continuous.

Continuity: R vs R_0

R is continuous but R_0 is **not** mixture-continuous.

Example

Define R on $[0, 1]$ such that:

- for each $p \in [0, 1]$, we have $0.5 I p$,
- for each $p, p' \in (0.5, 1]$ and $q, q' \in [0, 0.5)$, we have $p I p'$, $p P q$, and $q I q'$.

Let $p \in (0.5, 1], q \in [0, 0.5)$.

$$UC(p) = [0.5, 1]; UC(q) = UC(0.5) = [0, 1]$$

Since $p P q$, we have $p P_0 q$. Moreover, $p P q I 0.5$, we have $p P_0 0.5$ for each $p \in (0.5, 1]$. This means $1 P_0 0.5$.

$$\therefore UMC_0(1; 1, 0) := \{\alpha \in [0, 1] : [\alpha 1 + (1 - \alpha)0] R_0 1\} = (0.5, 1],$$

Continuity: R_0 vs R

R is **not** mixture-continuous but R_0 is continuous.


Example

Let L be the set of lotteries on $X := \{x_1, x_2, x_3\}$ and $\epsilon \in (0, 0.5]$.
For each $p = (p_1, p_2, p_3), q = (q_1, q_2, q_3) \in L$,

- $p P q$ if $p_1 \geq q_1 + \epsilon$,
- $p I q$ if $|p_1 - q_1| < \epsilon$.

$p R_0 q$ if and only if $p_1 \geq q_1$.

$\text{UMC}((1, 0, 0); (1 - \epsilon, \epsilon/2, \epsilon/2), (1, 0, 0)) = [0, 1)$.



Independence

Definition

A reflexive binary relation R on L satisfies

- **independence** if for each $p, q, r \in L$ and each $\alpha \in (0, 1)$,
 $p P q$ if and only if $[\alpha p + (1 - \alpha)r] P [\alpha q + (1 - \alpha)r]$,
- **midpoint indifference**¹ if for each $p, q, r \in L$, $p I q$ implies
 $[1/2p + 1/2r] I [1/2q + 1/2r]$.

If a semiorder R on L satisfies independence then it also satisfies midpoint indifference. (trichotomy)

¹This property is introduced by Herstein and Milnor (1953).

Independence: Incompatibility

Independence is **incompatible** with intransitive indifference.

Proposition (Fishburn (1968))

Let R be a semiorder on L . If R satisfies the independence axiom, then I is transitive.

Proof.

Suppose $\exists p, q, r \in L$ such that $p I q I r$ but $p P r$.

$\implies \forall \alpha \in (0, 1), p P [\alpha p + (1 - \alpha)r] P r$

$\implies p P [\alpha p + (1 - \alpha)r] P r I q$ (**PPI** \implies **P**)

$\implies p P q \rightarrow \leftarrow$

□

Remark: Midpoint indifference is **compatible** with intransitive indifference.

Expected Scott-Suppes Representation

Definition

Let R be a reflexive binary relation on X , $u : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be a function, and $k \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$. The pair (u, k) is an **Expected SS Representation** of R if for each $x, y \in X$,

$$x P y \iff \mathbb{E}[u(x)] > \mathbb{E}[u(y)] + k$$

$$x I y \iff |\mathbb{E}[u(x)] - \mathbb{E}[u(y)]| \leq k$$

Open Problem Fishburn (1968)

- When is it possible to have a **Expected Scott-Suppes Representation** for a semiorder R on L ?
 - an **analog** of the Expected Utility Theorem of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).
- Equivalently, when is $u : L \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ **linear**? – if (u,k) is an SS representation of R on L .

Open Problem Fishburn (1968)

To illustrate, we recall from Scott and Suppes (1958) that if \prec on \mathcal{P} is a semiorder and if \mathcal{P} is a finite set then there is a real-valued function u on \mathcal{P} such that, for all P and Q in \mathcal{P} ,

$$P \prec Q \text{ if and only if } u(P) + 1 < u(Q).$$

Proofs of this are given by Scott (1964), Scott and Suppes (1958), and Suppes and Zinnes (1963). Its obvious counterpart in the risky-choice setting is

$$P \prec Q \text{ if and only if } E(u, P) + 1 < E(u, Q), \quad (1)$$

which generally violates A3 and A4. However, each of the following axioms, the first three of which are independence axioms, with A8 a typical Archimedean condition, is implied by (1).

A5. If $P \prec Q$ and $0 < \alpha < 1$ then not $\alpha Q + (1 - \alpha)R \prec \alpha P + (1 - \alpha)R$.

A6. If $P \prec Q$, $R \prec S$, and $0 < \alpha < 1$ then $\alpha P + (1 - \alpha)R \prec \alpha Q + (1 - \alpha)S$.

A7. If $P \sim Q$, $R \sim S$, and $0 < \alpha < 1$ then $\alpha P + (1 - \alpha)R \sim \alpha Q + (1 - \alpha)S$.

A8. If $P \prec Q$ and $Q \prec R$ then $\alpha P + (1 - \alpha)R \prec Q$ and $Q \prec \beta P + (1 - \beta)R$

for some α, β strictly between 0 and 1.

Note also that (1) implies A1, A2, and the third Scott-Suppes semiorder condition.

Thus, we have identified two main routes for the preservation of intransitive indifference with risky choices: first, retain A3–A4 and weaken A2; second, retain A2 and use independence axioms like A5–A7 but not A3–A4. Both routes await further exploration.

REFERENCES

- FISHBURN, P. C. Bounded expected utility. *Annals of Mathematical Statistics*, 1967, **38**, 1054–1060.
- FRIEDMAN, M. AND SAVAGE, L. J. The expected-utility hypothesis and the measurability of utility. *Journal of Political Economy*, 1952, **60**, 463–474.
- JENSEN, N. E. An introduction to Bernoullian utility theory. I. utility functions. *Swedish Journal of Economics*, 1967, **69**, 163–183.
- LUCK, R. D. Semiorders and a theory of utility discrimination. *Econometrica*, 1956, **24**, 178–191.
- SAMUELSON, P. A. Probability, utility, and the independence axiom. *Econometrica*, 1952, **20**, 619–678.
- SAVAGE, L. J. *The foundations of statistics*. New York: Wiley, 1954.
- SCOTT, D. Measurement structures and linear inequalities. *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 1964, **1**, 233–247.
- SCOTT, D. AND SUPPES, P. Foundational aspects of theories of measurement. *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 1958, **23**, 113–128.
- SUPPES, P. AND ZINNES, J. L. Basic measurement theory. In R. D. Luce, R. R. Bush, and E. Galanter (Eds.), *Handbook of mathematical psychology*, Vol. 1. New York: Wiley, 1963.

A Linear Representation with a Threshold Function

Theorem (Vincke(1980))

Let (P, I) be a pair of binary relations on L . Then,

- (P, I) is a semiorder,
- R_0 is mixture-continuous and satisfies midpoint indifference,
- $L \setminus M_R$ has maximal indifference elements in L with respect to R

if and only if there exist a linear function $u : L \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and a non-negative function $\sigma : L \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ such that for each $p, q \in L$, we have

- 1 $p P q$ if and only if $u(p) > u(q) + \sigma(q)$,
- 2 $p I q$ if and only if $u(p) + \sigma(p) \geq u(q)$ and $u(q) + \sigma(q) \geq u(p)$,
- 3 $p I_0 q$ if and only if $u(p) = u(q)$,
- 4 $u(p) > u(q)$ implies $u(p) + \sigma(p) \geq u(q) + \sigma(q)$,
- 5 $u(p) = u(q)$ implies $\sigma(p) = \sigma(q)$.

A Linear Representation with a Threshold Function

Theorem (Herstein and Milnor (1953))

R_0 on L is a **weak order** that is **mixture-continuous** and satisfies **midpoint indifference** if and only if there exist a **linear** function $u : L \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that for each $p, q \in L$, we have

$$p R_0 q \iff u(p) \geq u(q)$$

Definition

Let R be a semiorder on X and $S \subseteq X$. We say S has **maximal indifference elements** in X with respect to R if for each $s \in S$, there exists $s' \in X$ such that

- $s I s'$ and
- for each $y \in X$, $y P_0 s'$ implies $y P s$.

Vincke (1980)'s construction

- We say $x \in X$ is **maximal** with respect to R if for each $y \in X$, $x R y$.
 - We denote the set of all maximal elements of X with respect to R as M_R .

Construction of the threshold function $\sigma : L \longrightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$:

$$\sigma(p) := \begin{cases} u(p') - u(p) & p \in L \setminus M_R \\ \sup_{q \in L} u(q) - u(p) & p \in M_R \end{cases}$$

where p' is the **maximal indifference element** of p .

Regularity

Definition

A reflexive binary relation R on X is **non-trivial** if there exist $x, y \in X$ such that $x P y$.

Definition

A reflexive binary relation R on L is **regular** if there are no $p, q \in L$ and no sequences $(p_n), (q_n) \in L^{\mathbb{N}}$ such that for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, we have $p P p_n$ and $p_{n+1} P p_n$ or for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, we have $q_n P q$ and $q_n P q_{n+1}$.

That is, a binary relation is regular if its asymmetric part has **no infinite up** or **infinite down chain** with an **upper** or **lower bound**, respectively.

Mixture Symmetry

Definition (Nakamura(1988))

A reflexive binary relation R on L is **mixture-symmetric** if for each $p, q \in L$ and each $\alpha \in [0, 1]$,

$$p I [\alpha p + (1 - \alpha)q] \implies q I [\alpha q + (1 - \alpha)p]$$

The Main Result

Theorem (Expected Scott-Suppes Utility Representation)

Let R be a non-trivial semiorder on L . Then,

- R is **regular** and **mixture-symmetric**,
- R_0 is **mixture-continuous** and **midpoint indifference**,
- $L \setminus M_R$ has **maximal indifference elements** in L with respect to R

if and only if there exists a **linear** function $u : L \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and $k \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$ such that (u, k) is an **Expected Scott-Suppes representation** of R . i.e., for each $p, q \in L$ we have

$$p R q \Leftrightarrow \mathbb{E}[u(p)] \geq \mathbb{E}[u(q)] + k.$$

Uniqueness

Proposition

Let (u, k) be an expected Scott-Suppes utility representation of a semiorder R on L , $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$, and $\beta \in \mathbb{R}$. If $v : L \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is such that for each $p \in L$, $v(p) = \alpha u(p) + \beta$, then $(v, \alpha k)$ is also an expected Scott-Suppes utility representation of R .

Equilibrium

- Let $\langle N, (A_i)_{i \in N}, (R_i)_{i \in N} \rangle$ be a **normal form game** such that:
 - R_i is a non-trivial semiorder on $\Delta(A)$ which satisfies **reg**, **mix-sym**, **mix-cont**, **mid indiff**, **max indiff**.

Definition

A (possibly mixed) action profile $\sigma^* = (\sigma_i^*, \sigma_{-i}^*) \in \Delta(A)$ is an **equilibrium** of $\langle N, (A_i)_{i \in N}, (R_i)_{i \in N} \rangle$ if for each $i \in N$ there **does not exist** $a_i \in A_i$ such that

$$(a_i, \sigma_{-i}^*) P_i \sigma^*.$$

Epsilon Equilibrium

Definition

A (possibly mixed) action profile $\sigma^* = (\sigma_i^*, \sigma_{-i}^*) \in \Delta(A)$ is an **equilibrium** of $\langle N, (A_i)_{i \in N}, (R_i)_{i \in N} \rangle$ if for each $i \in N$ there **does not exist** $a_i \in A_i$ such that

$$u_i((a_i, \sigma_{-i}^*)) > u_i(\sigma^*) + k_i.$$

Definition

A (possibly mixed) action profile $\sigma^* = (\sigma_i^*, \sigma_{-i}^*) \in \Delta(A)$ is an **equilibrium** of $\langle N, (A_i)_{i \in N}, (R_i)_{i \in N} \rangle$ if for each $i \in N$ and for each $a_i \in A_i$ we have

$$v_i(\sigma^*) \geq v_i((a_i, \sigma_{-i}^*)) - \epsilon.$$

On Epsilon Equilibrium

- This is the **same** definition given by Radner (1980) for epsilon equilibrium. A **reinterpretation** for the concept of epsilon equilibrium:
 - In most of the applications, economists construct preferences of agents after observing their choice behavior.
 - The reason why preferences are constructed as weak orders is mainly due to **tractability**, i.e., to have **measurable utility**.
 - However, it is possible that the underlying preferences exhibit **intransitive indifference** and because of missing choice data (and due to the weak order convention), we might be observing outcomes that look like an epsilon equilibrium.
 - It might also be the case that the revealed preferences of agents look like a weak order over deterministic outcomes. But, this **does not have to be the case for lotteries** over these outcomes – especially when respective probabilities are close to each other.

Independence of the Axioms

Let R be a non-trivial semiorder on L .


- R is regular (**reg**),
- R is mixture-symmetric (**mix-sym**),
- R_0 is mixture-continuous (**mix-cont**),
- R_0 satisfies midpoint indifference (**mid indiff**),
- $L \setminus M_R$ has maximal indifference elements in L with respect to R (**max indiff**).

[Reg, Mix-sym, Mix-cont,
Mid indiff, Max indiff]

Example

Let L be the set of lotteries on $X := \{x_1, x_2, x_3\}$, $p, q \in L$, and $\epsilon \in (0, 0.5]$. We define R on L such that:

- $p P q$ if $p_1 > q_1 + \epsilon$,
- $p I q$ if $|p_1 - q_1| \leq \epsilon$.



[Reg, Mix-sym, Mix-cont, Mid indiff \Rightarrow
Max indiff]

Example

Let L be the set of lotteries on $X := \{x_1, x_2, x_3\}$, $p, q \in L$, and $\epsilon \in (0, 0.5]$. We define R on L such that:

- $p P q$ if $p_1 \geq q_1 + \epsilon$,
- $p I q$ if $|p_1 - q_1| < \epsilon$.

[Reg, Mix-sym, Mix-cont, Max indiff \Rightarrow
Mid indiff]

Example

Let L be the set of lotteries on $X := \{x_1, x_2\}$ and $p, q \in L$. We define R on L such that:

- $p P q$ if $p_1 > q_1 + 0.6$,
- $p I q$ if $|p_1 - q_1| \leq 0.6$.

[Reg, Mix-sym, Mid indiff, Max indiff \Rightarrow
Mix-cont]

Example

Let L be the set of lotteries on $X := \{x_1, x_2\}$ and $p, q \in L$. We define R on L such that:

- $p P q$ if $p_1 = 1$ and $q_1 = 0$,
- $p I q$ if $\neg(p P q)$ and $\neg(q P p)$.

[Reg, Mix-cont, Mid indiff, Max indiff
 \Rightarrow **Mix-sym**]

Example

Let L be the set of lotteries on $X := \{x_1, x_2\}$ and $p, q \in L$. We define R on L such that:

- $p P q$ if $2p_1 > 3q_1 + 0.5$,
- $p I q$ if $|2p_1 - 3q_1| \leq 0.5$.

[Mix-sym, Mix-cont, Mid indiff, Max
indiff \Rightarrow **Reg**]

Example

Let L be the set of lotteries on $X := \{x_1, x_2\}$ and $p, q \in L$. We define R on L such that:

- $p P q$ if $p_1 > q_1$,
- $p I q$ if $p_1 = q_1$.

Conclusion

- We studied decision making under uncertainty with a semiordered choice model.
- “*A consumer choice model with semi-ordered rather than weak-ordered preferences is not only more realistic, but it also allows for the comparison of utility differences across individuals.*” (Argenziano and Gilboa (2017))
- We characterized an Expected Scott-Suppes Utility Representation Theorem.
- This was an open problem pointed out by Fishburn (1968).
- Our characterization gives a reinterpretation for the concept of epsilon equilibrium.
- Intransitive indifference seems **inescapable**.

Thank you!

Motivation

The physical continuum is like a nebula whose elements cannot be perceived, even with the most sophisticated instruments; of course, with a good balance (instead of human sensation), it would be possible to distinguish 11 grams from 10 and 12 grams, so that we could write $A < B$, $B < C$, $A < C$. But one could always find other elements D and E such that $A = D$, $D = B$, $A < B$, $B = E$, $E = C$, $B < C$, and the difficulty would be the same; only the mind can resolve it and the answer is the mathematical continuum.

